AttestScopeFR

Specification · version 0.1.1

The AttestScope format

Normative text for writers, issuers and verifiers of record files. The key words MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD and MAY are used as in RFC 2119.

Verifiable Human Accountability for AI-Assisted Reasoning. AttestScope is a human accountability record: accountability in the sense of human responsibility, who answers for what, not in the legal sense of a text.

Version 0.1.1, published 26 October 2026 (version 0.1: 27 September 2026). The format will evolve: each new version is published here, with a list of its changes.

Reference implementation Riftveil · Publisher Riftveil

Guided reading · non-normative

Anatomy of a record: what the file contains

Elena’s record file as first sealed, part by part: six layers, two fingerprints, two seals, two signatures. For each field, what goes into a fingerprint, what each seal and each signature covers, and what stays outside.

Go to the text of the specification

Issuer · riftveil.ai Signer

Exploded view · Six layers

fieldgoes into the fingerprint fieldoutside the fingerprint

  1. 1

    Identity of the record

    formatversionrecord_id → idissueroriginissued_at

    The ID goes into the fingerprint under the name id. origin is covered by the seal through its label (riftveil-seal-v1 for “generated”). issued_at repeats the time of the ID.

  2. 2

    Assessment

    protocolmodelassistantlanguage

    language is informative. For a report made elsewhere and registered, it is assistant that goes into the fingerprint (profile riftveil-content-v1).

  3. 3

    Content: the exact texts

    projectcontextreport

    Copied exactly as they were assessed, sent and received, without trimming, reformatting or translation. They stay with the person who holds the file; the issuer keeps nothing.

  4. 4

    Proof of the report

    applied by riftveil.ai at the end of the assessment

    fingerprintsha-256 · riftveil-report-v1 · 44ad2fc8676594a6…f84689d9
    sealS1-REQ8-RW0G-J013-M23D-C969-73JZ-MF93-1W6J
    signatureed25519-1 · RLk8n-uArHiModfT…
    verificationhttps://riftveil.ai/api/verify

    HMAC-SHA256 seal (key 1) over "riftveil-seal-v1|" + id + "|" + fingerprint; Ed25519 signature (key ed25519-1) over the same message

  5. 5

    Follow-up: what the person did with it

    optional

    profileverified_bycheckedquestions[ n · question · suggested_owner · assigned_to ]decisionconditionsplacesignaturefinal_documentpreviousdecided_at

    Filled in by the person who decides, never by a model, after the report. Its fingerprint also includes the ID and the fingerprint of the report. It can name the final document, by its fingerprint computed on the device, and complete a previous follow-up, kept as it is with its proof. A follow-up may stay unsealed: it is then shown as “present, not sealed”.

  6. 6

    Proof of the follow-up

    sealed at 16:05:12 UTC

    fingerprintsha-256 · riftveil-decision-v2 · 2fd3a2ae0b46…180115c2
    sealS1-SP2R-M6Z9-3Y27-M5MB-YB16-57G7-MX47-8GFY
    signatureed25519-1 · H0tFeR7Q-VELQlHZ…
    verificationhttps://riftveil.ai/api/verify
    sealed_at2026-10-26T16:05:12Z

    HMAC seal (key 1) over "riftveil-decision-v1|" + id + "|" + fingerprint + "|" + sealed_at; Ed25519 signature (key ed25519-1) over the same message

Report fingerprint

Profile riftveil-report-v1:
v: 1
id
protocol
model
project
context
report

JSON.stringify of these seven fields, in this order, then SHA-256.

Report seal

Covers the ID, the fingerprint and the origin, through its label. The Ed25519 signature is over the same message: anyone checks it with the public key.

Follow-up fingerprint

v: 2
id
report_fingerprint
verified_by
checked
questions
decision
conditions
place
signature
final_document
previous

Follow-up seal

Covers the ID, the follow-up fingerprint and the seal time. It requires a valid report seal. The Ed25519 signature is over the same message.

The file · Riftveil XT-261026-143205-7K3M-Q9XD-2B8F.json

JSON, UTF-8

{
  "format": "attestscope",
  "version": "0.1.1",
  "record_id": "XT-261026-143205-7K3M-Q9XD-2B8F",
  "issuer": "XT",
  "origin": "generated",
  "issued_at": "2026-10-26T14:32:05Z",
  "assessment": {
    "protocol": "…",
    "model": "…",
    "assistant": "riftveil.ai",
    "language": "en"
  },
  "content": {
    "project": "We recommend consolidating our three cloud vendors into one five-year contract…",
    "context": "Board decision next month.",
    "report": "Record · Triage: CRITICAL · … · No verdict. The decision is yours."
  },
  "proof": {
    "fingerprint": {
      "alg": "sha-256",
      "profile": "riftveil-report-v1",
      "value": "44ad2fc8676594a6…f84689d9"
    },
    "seal": {
      "value": "S1-REQ8-RW0G-J013-M23D-C969-73JZ-MF93-1W6J",
      "verify": "https://riftveil.ai/api/verify"
    },
    "signature": {
      "alg": "ed25519",
      "key": "ed25519-1",
      "value": "RLk8n-uArHiModfT…",
      "keys": "https://attestscope.ai/test-keys.json"
    }
  },
  "follow_up": {
    "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2",
    "verified_by": { "last_name": "Lambert", "first_name": "Elena", "role": "Chief Financial Officer" },
    "checked": "The prices for years 2 to 5 of the three offers, with procurement.",
    "questions": [
      {
        "n": 1,
        "question": "What does leaving the contract cost if the price rises after the first year?",
        "suggested_owner": "Procurement",
        "assigned_to": "Daniel Murphy, Head of Procurement"
      }
    ],
    "decision": "conditions",
    "conditions": "Contract signed only after the exit-cost analysis, presented to the board.",
    "place": "",
    "signature": { "method": "drawn", "image": "data:image/png;base64,…" },
    "decided_at": "2026-10-26T16:05:12Z",
  "proof": {
      "fingerprint": {
        "alg": "sha-256",
        "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2",
        "value": "2fd3a2ae0b46…180115c2"
      },
      "seal": {
        "value": "S1-SP2R-M6Z9-3Y27-M5MB-YB16-57G7-MX47-8GFY",
        "sealed_at": "2026-10-26T16:05:12Z",
        "verify": "https://riftveil.ai/api/verify"
      },
      "signature": {
        "alg": "ed25519",
        "key": "ed25519-1",
        "value": "H0tFeR7Q-VELQlHZ…",
        "keys": "https://attestscope.ai/test-keys.json"
      }
    }
  },
  "notice": "…"
}

"format"Name of the format since version 0.1.1; records of version 0.1 read “assay-record” and stay readable. The notice, in the language of the report, is covered neither by the seal nor by the signature. Long texts are shortened here with “…”.

S1S1

Why two seals and two signatures

The follow-up is added after the report, without touching the seal of the assessment.

It belongs to one report only: its fingerprint includes that of the report. Moved to another report, it no longer verifies.

The follow-up seal is applied only if the report seal is valid. Each seal has its signature, over the same message.

What the report contains

Record

Triage: CRITICAL · examined: question, answer, reasoning, perspective, applicability

Findings: 3, by impact CRITICAL: 1 · HIGH: 2 · MODERATE: 0 · LOW: 0

Assumptions: 4 with a named verifier · 0 without

Questions: 5 with an owner · 1 without

Most useful question: What does leaving the contract cost if the price rises after the first year?

Independence: not stated by the user, to be confirmed by the signer

  • 1. Context and triage
  • 2. What holds up
  • 3. What deserves scrutiny · including a “Pre-mortem” at CRITICAL level
  • 4. Assumptions the project relies on
  • 5. Questions before you decide

“No verdict. The decision is yours.”

What never leaves the device

  • The names and the role
  • The decision and its conditions
  • The signature
  • The record file itself

To seal the follow-up, only its fingerprint is sent. The project and the context, for their part, pass through riftveil.ai for the assessment, without being kept there.

A fingerprint

SHA-256: 64 hexadecimal characters. Change one word, and the whole fingerprint changes. The text cannot be recovered from it.

“… into one five-year contract.”dfa18a55 1f031c3e 1978fec7 a8d78ba7 a0983362 b4f355fc b93887ac 5b066e0c

“… into one six-year contract.”ce0e83d7 7c9ef54d 5422ad16 61a90317 f29f2276 b6f5b01c d53b7327 3fa423fc

Real computation on the single sentence of the project, in UTF-8. The fingerprint of a record, for its part, covers every field of its profile.

Illustrative example: people, organisations and amounts are fictitious. The prefix XT is reserved for tests: the seals and signatures in the example are made with the public test keys and are never valid for a decision. Example as currently in service (specification 0.1.1): the report and the follow-up each carry a seal and a signature from riftveil.ai; the signature is checked with riftveil.ai’s public key, without going through riftveil.ai.

01Record file

AttestScope Protocol · version 0.1.1. One JSON file per record, UTF-8, named <Issuer name> <record_id>.json (Riftveil: Riftveil RV-261026-143205-7K3M-Q9XD-2B8F.json).

{
  "format": "attestscope",
  "version": "0.1.1",
  "record_id": "RV-261026-143205-7K3M-Q9XD-2B8F",
  "issuer": "RV",
  "origin": "generated",
  "issued_at": "2026-10-26T14:32:05Z",
  "assessment": { "protocol": "1.0.0", "model": "claude-sonnet-5", "assistant": "riftveil.ai", "language": "en" },
  "content": { "project": "…", "context": "…", "report": "…" },
  "proof": {
    "fingerprint": { "alg": "sha-256", "profile": "riftveil-report-v1", "value": "…64 hex…" },
    "seal": { "value": "S1-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX", "verify": "https://riftveil.ai/api/verify" },
    "signature": { "alg": "ed25519", "key": "ed25519-1", "value": "…86 base64url characters…", "keys": "https://riftveil.ai/keys.json" }
  },
  "notice": "…"
}
Field Rule
format, version "attestscope" and "0.1.1". Files of version 0.1 read "assay-record" and "0.1-draft"; they stay valid and every verifier MUST still read them.
issued_at MUST repeat the date and time of the record_id. A verifier MUST reject a file where they differ, and a record whose ID is dated in the future.
origin generated (the issuer produced the report) or registered (produced elsewhere, only its fingerprint was sent). Covered by the seal and the signature through their label.
assessment For riftveil-report-v1, protocol and model are in the fingerprint. For riftveil-content-v1, assistant is. language is informative.
content The exact texts. They stay with the person who holds the file; the issuer keeps nothing.
proof.fingerprint Recomputed by every verifier from content (and the fields above). Never trusted as written.
proof.seal Checked by the issuer's endpoint against the recomputed fingerprint.
proof.signature REQUIRED in version 0.1.1. The issuer's Ed25519 signature over the same message as the seal. Anyone can check it with the issuer's published public key, without asking the issuer. See Record ID, seal and signature.
proof.timestamps OPTIONAL. A list of time stamps over the same message, from time-stamping authorities (RFC 3161). See Record ID, seal and signature.
notice Informative. Not covered by any fingerprint.

Two forms of the same record

Form Holds Kept by Used for
Record file Everything above, content included The signer, with the PDF, in the decision file Verifying that a text is intact
Register entry (planned, 0.2) Everything except content A register: Microsoft 365, the client's servers, or hosted (planned) Counting, following up, auditing the structure

Version 0.1.1 defines the record file; the register entry is planned for 0.2.

A register never needs the project: the fingerprint lets it prove which content a record belongs to without holding it. Whoever holds the record file holds the content: share it as you would share the report.

Follow-up and decision (follow_up, optional)

Filled in by the person who decides, never by a model, after the report. It has its own fingerprint, its own seal and its own signature, so it can be added without touching the proof of the assessment.

"follow_up": {
  "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2",
  "verified_by": { "last_name": "…", "first_name": "…", "role": "…" },
  "checked": "What the person checked themselves",
  "questions": [ { "n": 1, "question": "…", "suggested_owner": "CFO", "assigned_to": "…" } ],
  "decision": "proceed | conditions | stop",
  "conditions": "…",
  "place": "…",
  "signature": { "method": "drawn | typed", "typed": "…", "image": "data:image/png;base64,…" },
  "final_document": { "name": "Board memo.pdf", "size": 284113, "sha256": "…64 hex…" },
  "previous": { "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2", "…": "the follow-up this one completes, with its proof" },
  "decided_at": "2026-10-26T16:05:12Z",
  "proof": {
    "fingerprint": { "alg": "sha-256", "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2", "value": "…64 hex…" },
    "seal": { "value": "S1-…", "sealed_at": "2026-10-26T16:05:12Z", "verify": "https://riftveil.ai/api/verify" },
    "signature": { "alg": "ed25519", "key": "ed25519-1", "value": "…", "keys": "https://riftveil.ai/keys.json" }
  }
}
Field Rule
profile riftveil-decision-v2 in a 0.1.1 file. riftveil-decision-v1 (version 0.1) appears in a 0.1.1 file only under previous, when a 0.1 file was completed.
Fingerprint input riftveil-decision-v2: JSON.stringify({ v: 2, id, report_fingerprint, verified_by, checked, questions, decision, conditions, place, signature, final_document, previous }), with every field present: empty strings when not filled, final_document as { name: "", size: 0, sha256: "" } when absent, previous as { fingerprint, seal, sealed_at } of the follow-up it completes, or three empty strings. report_fingerprint is the recomputed fingerprint of the assessment: a follow-up belongs to one report only. riftveil-decision-v1: the same object without final_document and previous, with v: 1.
signature A simple electronic signature made on screen by the person who decides. Not to be confused with proof.signature, the issuer's signature. The seal and the issuer's signature prove when the follow-up existed and that it has not changed, never who wrote it.
final_document OPTIONAL. The document that actually goes out after the decision (a memo, a contract, a deck): its file name, its size in bytes and the SHA-256 of its bytes, computed on the signer's device. The document itself is never sent. A verifier can then say whether a given document is the one that was decided.
previous OPTIONAL. When a person completes a sealed follow-up later (answers to the questions, conditions met), the new follow-up holds the earlier one in full, with its proof, and its fingerprint covers the earlier fingerprint, seal and seal time. Each earlier follow-up keeps its own proof. The earlier follow-up MUST be sealed, and sealed strictly before the one that completes it. A file SHOULD NOT hold more than 20 earlier follow-ups.
decided_at Informative, set by the signer's device. Not covered by the fingerprint or the seal: the proven time is proof.seal.sealed_at.
proof.seal Issued by the issuer on the follow-up fingerprint and the issuer's clock (sealed_at); it requires a valid seal of the assessment. Only fingerprints are sent: names, decision, signature and documents never leave the signer's device.
proof.signature REQUIRED when the follow-up of a 0.1.1 file is sealed. The issuer's Ed25519 signature over the same message as the follow-up seal.
Unsealed follow-up Allowed. A verifier shows it as present but unsealed: nothing proves when it was written or that it was not changed.
Who wrote it Not proven. Anyone who holds the record file can seal a follow-up for it, under any name, and several follow-ups can exist for one report. The seal and the issuer's signature prove when a follow-up existed and that it has not changed since; identity needs the organisation's account or a qualified signature (planned). A verifier MUST NOT present the name in a follow-up as verified.

Later versions will add outcome (what became of the decision) and readers[] (the chain of second readers), each with its own fingerprint.

02Record ID, seal and signature

AttestScope Protocol · version 0.1.1 · normative for every implementation, including Riftveil.

The key words MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD and MAY are used as in RFC 2119.

1. Format

<ISSUER>-<YYMMDD>-<HHMMSS>-<RRRR>-<RRRR>-<RRRR>
RV-261026-143205-7K3M-Q9XD-2B8F
Part Rule
ISSUER 2 to 6 letters A to Z, registered in ISSUERS.md. RV is Riftveil. An implementation MUST NOT use a prefix it has not registered. XT is reserved for tests and MUST NOT appear in a record used for a decision.
YYMMDD UTC date at which the ID is assigned (years 2000 to 2099).
HHMMSS UTC time at which the ID is assigned, to the second, from a clock synchronised with a public time source.
RRRR-RRRR-RRRR 60 bits from a cryptographically secure random generator, written in Crockford base32 (0-9 A-Z without I L O U), 12 characters in 3 groups of 4.

Pattern: ^[A-Z]{2,6}-\d{6}-\d{6}-[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{4}-[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{4}-[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{4}$

2. Assignment

  1. The ID MUST be assigned by code, at the moment the record is created.
  2. The ID MUST NOT be produced, suggested or completed by a language model. Models repeat "random" values; an ID written by a model is not unique.
  3. The ID MUST NOT be derived from the content (a hash of the project or of the report): two identical projects assessed twice are two records.
  4. An ID MUST NOT be reused, even for a new version of the same record. A new version gets a new ID and points to the previous one.
  5. Readers MUST accept lower case and spaces; the canonical form is upper case with hyphens.

3. Why duplicates are practically excluded

  • Two issuers cannot collide: the prefixes differ.
  • Within one issuer, two IDs can only collide if they are assigned in the same second and draw the same 60 random bits (1 chance in 1.15 × 10¹⁸ for any pair).
  • At 1 million records a day for one issuer, the probability of a single duplicate is about 1 in 500 million per year. At 1,000 records per second, about 1 in 70,000 per year.
  • This is a probability, not a mathematical impossibility. An issuer that needs absolute uniqueness MAY also check each new ID against its own register and draw again on a match; it MUST NOT shorten the random part to do so.

4. Seal

An issuer MUST seal each record of version 0.1.1, so that it can confirm, without storing anything, that it issued the ID for this content. (In version 0.1 the seal was recommended.)

  • Fingerprint. SHA-256, in hexadecimal, of the content the issuer defines as the record content. The definition (profile) MUST be published and MUST include the ID whenever the issuer produced the content itself.
  • Message. "<label>|" + id + "|" + fingerprint, in UTF-8. For a follow-up: "<label>|" + id + "|" + fingerprint + "|" + sealed_at.
  • Seal. S<k>- followed by the first 160 bits of HMAC-SHA256(key_k, message), in Crockford base32, 8 groups of 4. k is the key number; a new key gets a new number and old keys stay available for verification.
  • One label per origin. An issuer that both produces reports and registers reports produced elsewhere MUST use a different label for each, so that a seal can never be presented as the other origin. The follow-up has its own label.
  • Key. It MUST stay secret with the issuer, in a secret store, never in code, a shared file or a conversation.
  • Verification endpoint. The issuer MUST publish one that answers valid or not valid, and the origin, for { id, fingerprint, seal }, and stores nothing.

A valid seal shows that the issuer assigned the ID, at the time given by its clock, for this fingerprint and this origin. A seal concerns date and integrity; the substance stays with the person who signs.

Legal scope. A seal defined in this section is a code computed by the issuer with a secret key. It shows that the issuer assigned the ID, at the time given by the issuer's clock, for this fingerprint and this origin.

5. Signature

Since version 0.1.1, the issuer also signs each message it seals, with a public-key signature. A seal can only be checked by the issuer; a signature can be checked by anyone, with the issuer's public key, without asking the issuer.

  • Algorithm. Ed25519 (RFC 8032), pure, without pre-hashing.
  • Message. Exactly the message of the seal (section 4), byte for byte, in UTF-8. The signature therefore covers the same ID, fingerprint, origin and, for a follow-up, seal time.
  • Encoding. The 64-byte signature in base64url (RFC 4648, section 5), without padding: 86 characters. Only the canonical encoding is valid: a verifier MUST reject a value whose last character carries non-zero spare bits. Neither the signature nor the seal may be used as an identifier.
  • Field. proof.signature in the record, follow_up.proof.signature in the follow-up: { "alg": "ed25519", "key": "<key id>", "value": "<base64url>", "keys": "<URL of the key list>" }. keys is informative: anyone can write a file, so a verifier MUST NOT use it to choose the key list (section 6).
  • Required. A 0.1.1 file MUST carry proof.signature, and a sealed follow-up of a 0.1.1 file MUST carry follow_up.proof.signature. An issuer that has no signing key writes version 0.1 files.
  • Private key. It MUST be created and kept by the issuer in a secret store, never in code, a shared file or a conversation. It MUST NOT be the sealing key. It MUST be available only to the production service of the issuer, never to test or preview deployments reachable by others; an issuer SHOULD also bind signing to its production host name.
  • Signing later (countersignature). An issuer MAY sign, at a later time, the message of a report whose seal it has just checked, only when the record is dated before the issuer started signing (valid_from of its first key). This lets a 0.1 record become a 0.1.1 record when a follow-up is added. A verifier MUST show such a signature as made after the date of the record. An issuer MUST NOT sign later a report dated after it started signing: such a record already carries its signature, so a stolen sealing key cannot be turned into new signatures for it.

A valid signature shows that the holder of the issuer's private key signed this message. It says nothing more than the seal, and nothing less: it concerns date and integrity, never the substance.

6. Public keys

The issuer MUST publish its public keys in a key list, at a fixed address registered with its prefix in ISSUERS.md, and SHOULD publish the same list in at least two other places it does not host on the same server. A verifier MUST take the key list from the address registered for the prefix of the record_id (or from a copy of that list it already trusts), never from the record file. Riftveil: https://riftveil.ai/keys.json, keys/riftveil.json in the AttestScope specification repository on GitHub, and https://attestscope.ai/keys/riftveil.json.

{
  "issuer": "RV",
  "updated": "2026-10-26",
  "rules": "…",
  "keys": [
    {
      "id": "ed25519-1",
      "alg": "ed25519",
      "public_key": "…43 base64url characters…",
      "status": "active",
      "valid_from": "2026-10-26",
      "valid_until": null,
      "compromised_at": null
    }
  ]
}
Field Rule
id ed25519-<n>, numbered like the sealing keys. A number is never reused.
public_key The 32-byte public key, base64url without padding.
status active (signs today), retired (no longer signs; its signatures stay valid) or compromised.
valid_from, valid_until Dates (UTC) between which the key signed. valid_until is null while the key is active.
compromised_at For a compromised key: the date from which its private part may have been known to someone else.
issuer, updated, rules The issuer prefix, the date of the last change, and the rules of the list in plain words. Informative.

Rules of the list:

  1. No key is ever removed from the list. A retired key stays, with its dates.
  2. A compromised key stays on the list, marked compromised and dated. A verifier MUST NOT report a signature made with it as valid on its own, whatever its date; the record then needs other evidence (a time stamp, a register).
  3. A verifier MUST show when the time of a record (the time in its ID, or sealed_at for a follow-up) is before valid_from of the key that signed it (a signature made later, see section 5), and MUST NOT report as valid a signature over a record dated after valid_until.
  4. A verifier MUST NOT accept, as a valid record of this issuer, an unsigned file (version 0.1) whose ID is dated after the issuer started signing: its signature has been removed.
  5. The three published copies MUST be identical. A verifier that finds a difference MUST NOT rely on the list.
  6. The issuer keeps checking its HMAC seals with every sealing key for at least twelve months after announcing that it will stop checking them.

7. Time stamps

proof.timestamps (and follow_up.proof.timestamps) is an OPTIONAL list. Each entry is a time stamp over the SHA-256 of the same message as the seal and the signature:

"timestamps": [
  { "type": "rfc3161", "tsa": "Name of the authority", "imprint": "…64 hex…", "token": "…base64 of the DER TimeStampToken…" }
]
Field Rule
type rfc3161. Other types MAY be defined later.
tsa Name of the time-stamping authority, informative.
imprint SHA-256, in hexadecimal, of the message (section 4). It MUST equal the message imprint inside the token.
token The RFC 3161 TimeStampToken, DER, in base64.

A time stamp proves the date independently of the issuer. A time stamp issued by a qualified trust service provider under a qualified time-stamping service is a qualified electronic time stamp within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014. An organisation MAY use its own time-stamping authority. Several time stamps MAY be added to the same record. At Riftveil, time stamps from a third-party authority are planned as an option with AttestScope traceability; Riftveil adds none today. The date and time of the issuer's clock, sealed and signed (issued_at through the ID, sealed_at), are the issuer's time stamp (at Riftveil: the Riftveil time stamp).

8. Riftveil profiles

Origin Label Profile Fingerprint input
generated on riftveil.ai riftveil-seal-v1 riftveil-report-v1 JSON.stringify({ v: 1, id, protocol, model, project, context, report })
produced elsewhere, registered riftveil-register-v1 riftveil-content-v1 JSON.stringify({ v: 1, assistant, project, context, report })
follow-up and decision (0.1.1) riftveil-decision-v1 riftveil-decision-v2 see record-file.md
follow-up and decision (0.1) riftveil-decision-v1 riftveil-decision-v1 see record-file.md

The label of the follow-up stays riftveil-decision-v1 for both profiles: the profile version is inside the fingerprint input (v). Strings are used exactly as sent to and returned by the model (generated) or as pasted by the person who registers (registered). Verification: POST https://riftveil.ai/api/verify. Keys: https://riftveil.ai/keys.json.

9. Record file

The record file is the record itself, in JSON: see record-file.md. A record is verified on its record file, never on a printout, a screenshot or a PDF alone: the ID, the fingerprint, the seal and the signature can be copied onto an altered document, the text of a record file cannot be altered without the check failing. See verification.md.

03Verification

The rule

A record is verified on its record file, never on a printout, a screenshot or a PDF alone.

  1. Check the form: issued_at repeats the time of the record_id, the ID is not dated in the future, every text field is a string. Otherwise: not conforming. Recompute the fingerprint from the content of the record file, following its profile.
  2. If it differs from the fingerprint written in the file: content altered. Stop.
  3. Signature (version 0.1.1). Take the issuer's key list from the address registered for the prefix of the record_id (ISSUERS.md; Riftveil: https://riftveil.ai/keys.json), never from proof.signature.keys, which is written in the file. Find the key named by proof.signature.key, and check the Ed25519 signature over the seal message, built from the recomputed fingerprint and the origin the file states. Not valid, missing, or made with a key absent from the list: signature not valid. Made with a key marked compromised: key compromised, not valid on its own. Made with a key whose valid_from is after the date of the record: valid, shown as signed later (section 5 of Record ID, seal and signature). A version 0.1 file (no signature) whose ID is dated after the issuer started signing: signature removed, not valid. This step needs nobody's answer: the issuer is not asked.
  4. Seal. Send { id, fingerprint (recomputed), seal } to the issuer's endpoint. If the seal is not valid: not issued. If it is valid for another origin than the one the file states: forged origin. Stop.
  5. Otherwise: valid. Show the content of the file and ask the person to compare it with the document they were given. If they differ, the document was altered, whatever it says.
  6. If the file holds a follow_up: recompute its fingerprint (it includes the report fingerprint recomputed in step 1). Different: follow-up altered. No seal: follow-up present, not sealed. Otherwise check its signature as in step 3, over the follow-up message (with sealed_at), and send it with the request of step 4 as decision: { fingerprint, seal, sealedAt }; the answer adds decision: { valid, sealedAt }.
  7. If the follow-up holds previous: verify each earlier follow-up the same way, down the chain, including its signature when it is a 0.1.1 follow-up. An earlier follow-up that is altered, not valid, badly signed, or not sealed strictly before the one that completes it is reported as such; the follow-up that completes it stays valid, since its fingerprint covers only the earlier proof. A verifier MAY stop after 20 earlier follow-ups and report the file as not conforming.
  8. If the follow-up holds final_document: when a person presents a document, compute the SHA-256 of its bytes on their device and compare it with final_document.sha256. Equal: this is the document that was decided. Different: not the document that was decided.

Steps 3 and 4 answer the same question in two ways: the signature with the public key, by anyone; the seal by the issuer. A verifier without network access to the issuer can still check the signature, with a copy of the key list.

Checking the three values alone (ID, fingerprint, seal) only proves that they belong together, not that a given text is the record.

Riftveil endpoints

Endpoint Body Answer
POST https://riftveil.ai/api/verify { id, fingerprint, seal, signature?, decision? } { valid: true, id, issuedAt, origin, signature?, decision? } or { valid: false }; signature is { valid, key, status?, reason? }, and a key marked compromised always gives valid: false
POST https://riftveil.ai/api/register { fingerprint, profile: "riftveil-content-v1" } { id, seal, signature, issuedAt, origin: "registered", profile }
POST https://riftveil.ai/api/decide { id, report_fingerprint, report_seal, fingerprint } { seal, sealedAt, origin, signature, report_signature }
GET https://riftveil.ai/keys.json The key list (section 6 of Record ID, seal and signature)

/api/verify accepts requests from any site (CORS), receives fingerprints only and stores nothing; given signature: { key, value } (and decision.signature), it also checks the signatures with the published keys, as a convenience. /api/register and /api/decide are used from riftveil.ai pages, behind a bot check; they also receive fingerprints only and keep nothing but a daily counter per hashed IP address. report_signature is the signature of the report's seal message: it lets a 0.1 record, or a registered one, be completed into a 0.1.1 record. https://riftveil.ai/issuers.json lists the registered prefixes.

Pages and widget

  • https://riftveil.ai/verify.html (FR: /fr/verify.html): verification by record file, or by the three values with a warning. The signature is checked in the browser with the public key; a final document can be compared there; "Complete the follow-up" reopens the record to add a follow-up that completes the earlier one.
  • https://riftveil.ai/register.html (FR: /fr/register.html): registration of a report produced elsewhere; the fingerprint is computed in the browser and the record file is downloaded; the follow-up can then be filled in and sealed, as for a report generated on riftveil.ai.
  • Widget for any page (it verifies the assessment, its signature, and the seal and signature of the follow-up; earlier follow-ups and the follow-up itself are shown on riftveil.ai/verify, which is the full verifier):
<div data-riftveil-verify data-lang="fr"></div>
<script src="https://riftveil.ai/embed/verify.js" defer></script>

The host page's Content-Security-Policy must allow script-src and connect-src https://riftveil.ai.

What remains possible, and what to do about it

Risk Status
Altered text in a PDF Detected when the record file is used; not detected on a PDF alone. A qualified electronic seal on the PDF is planned.
Document changed after the decision Detected when the follow-up names a final document and the document is presented for comparison.
ID copied from another record Detected: the record file shows the other record's text.
Registered report presented as generated Detected: one label per origin, in the seal and in the signature.
Fabricated project assessed for real Not detectable, and not the purpose: the seal proves provenance and integrity, never truth.
Theft of the sealing key Key in a secret store, rotation by key number without invalidating earlier seals. The signing key is a separate key.
Theft of the signing key Key in a secret store, numbered; the key is marked compromised and dated in the published list, and is never removed from it.
Issuer no longer available The signature stays verifiable with the published key list.
Follow-up added by someone other than the person named Not prevented: the seal proves when, not who. The name is shown as declared, never as verified.
Signature removed to pass as 0.1 Detected: an unsigned file dated after the issuer started signing is rejected.
Nobody verifies Organisational: make the record file mandatory in the decision file.

04Conformance

AttestScope Protocol · version 0.1.1. The key words MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD and MAY are used as in RFC 2119.

A conformance claim names the role and the version: "writes AttestScope 0.1.1 record files", "verifies AttestScope 0.1.1 record files", "issues AttestScope 0.1.1 records under prefix XX". A conformance claim to this specification concerns the format only. The attestation recorded in an AttestScope Record is the signer's, on the scope of their own review.

Writer

A tool that writes record files:

  1. MUST produce UTF-8 JSON that validates against schema/attestscope-0.1.1.schema.json.
  2. MUST copy the texts into content exactly as they were assessed, sent and returned, without trimming, reformatting or translation.
  3. MUST compute proof.fingerprint.value from those exact texts with the profile it names, and fill the fields that profile needs: assessment.protocol and assessment.model for riftveil-report-v1, assessment.assistant for riftveil-content-v1.
  4. MUST NOT let a language model write, suggest or complete the record_id, the fingerprint, the seal, the signature or any field of follow_up.
  5. MUST leave follow_up absent, or with every field empty, until a person fills it in.
  6. MUST compute the fingerprint of a final document on the signer's device, and MUST NOT send the document.
  7. When a person completes a sealed follow-up, MUST keep the earlier follow-up in full under previous, with its proof, and MUST NOT change it.
  8. SHOULD name the file <Issuer name> <record_id>.json.

Issuer

An issuer assigns IDs, seals and signs:

  1. MUST use a prefix registered in ISSUERS, and MUST NOT issue records under XT for real decisions.
  2. MUST assign IDs by code, in the format of Record ID, seal and signature, from a clock synchronised with a public time source.
  3. MUST keep its sealing keys and its signing keys in a secret store, as separate keys, number them, and keep retired sealing keys available for verification.
  4. MUST use one label per origin and one for the follow-up.
  5. MUST sign every message it seals in a 0.1.1 record, with the private key of an active key of its published list.
  6. MUST publish its key list at the address named in its signatures, keep it identical wherever it is published, never remove a key from it, and mark and date a compromised key.
  7. MUST publish a verification endpoint that answers valid or not valid, the origin, and for a follow-up the seal time, for fingerprints only, and stores nothing.
  8. MUST NOT keep the texts, a list of IDs or a list of fingerprints for verification purposes.
  9. MUST check the seal of the report before sealing a follow-up.
  10. MUST keep its signing key out of every test or preview deployment reachable by others, and MUST NOT sign later a report dated after it started signing.
  11. SHOULD rate-limit sealing, signing and registration, fail closed when its counters are unavailable, and protect them against automated abuse.

Verifier

A tool that verifies record files:

  1. MUST recompute every fingerprint from the file, following its profile, and MUST NOT trust a fingerprint as written.
  2. MUST report "altered" when a recomputed fingerprint differs from the one in the file, and stop there for that part.
  3. MUST check each signature of a 0.1.1 file with the issuer's published key list, taken from the address registered for the prefix (never from the file), MUST report a missing signature as not valid, and MUST NOT report a signature made with a key marked compromised as valid on its own.
  4. MUST ask the issuer's endpoint to check each seal, sending only the ID, fingerprints, seals and seal times, when the issuer can be reached.
  5. MUST report the origin returned by the issuer, and "forged origin" when it differs from the one the file states.
  6. MUST verify each earlier follow-up under previous and report its result separately.
  7. MUST show the sealed texts so that a person can compare them with the document they were given.
  8. MUST compute the fingerprint of a presented final document on the person's device, and MUST NOT send the document.
  9. MUST NOT present a check of the ID, fingerprint and seal alone as a verification of a document.
  10. MUST still verify version 0.1 files, which carry no signature, and MUST reject one whose ID is dated after the issuer started signing.
  11. MUST reject a file whose issued_at differs from the time of its record_id, a non-canonical signature encoding, and a record whose prefix is XT when it is presented for a decision, and MUST show a signature made after the date of the record as such.
  12. MUST NOT present the name in a follow-up as verified.
  13. SHOULD state in its result that a valid record proves provenance and integrity, never that a decision was right.

05Security and privacy considerations

AttestScope Protocol · version 0.1.1.

Security and privacy: what is covered, and what is planned

What the format covers

Risk Countermeasure Residual risk
Text altered after issue Fingerprint recomputed from the file by every verifier None on the record file; a PDF shown alone proves nothing
ID or seal copied onto another document Verification shows the texts sealed under that ID A person must compare the texts with the document
Registered report presented as generated One label per origin, in the seal and in the signature None
Follow-up moved to another report Its fingerprint includes the report fingerprint None
Follow-up edited after sealing Its own fingerprint, seal and signature, with the issuer's time None if sealed; an unsealed follow-up proves nothing
Earlier follow-up edited after it was completed Its proof stays in the file; the follow-up that completes it covers its fingerprint, seal and seal time None: the earlier follow-up is reported as altered
Document changed after the decision final_document.sha256, compared on the reader's device Only when the follow-up names the document and the document is presented
Seal time moved The time is inside the sealed and signed message None
Forged seal HMAC-SHA256 truncated to 160 bits, secret key Only the issuer can check a seal: the signature covers the same message
Forged signature Ed25519, private key in a secret store; the key list is taken from the address registered for the issuer, never from the file None known
Issuer unreachable or gone The signature is checked with the published key list The list must stay published; it is published in three places
Stolen sealing key Secret store, numbered keys, rotation; separate signing key; no later signature for records dated after signing started Seals made with a stolen key cannot be told apart. New records still need the signing key. A record backdated before signing started could receive a later signature, which verifiers show as made after the date of the record
Stolen signing key Secret store, numbered keys; the key is marked compromised and dated, never removed Signatures made with it no longer prove anything on their own; a time stamp by a third party, or a register, is then needed
Signing key used by a test deployment Signing key in the production environment only, signing bound to the production host None if the rule is kept
Signature removed (file relabelled 0.1) A verifier rejects an unsigned file dated after the issuer started signing None
Follow-up added by someone else Not prevented: the follow-up proves when, not who A verifier never presents the name as verified; identity needs the organisation's account or a qualified signature (planned)
Mass sealing by robots Bot check, per-IP and global daily limits, closed when counters fail Counters on a key-value store are not atomic; a short burst can exceed a limit
Takeover of the issuer's code or accounts Strong authentication on the accounts that publish the code and the key lists; three copies of the list An attacker who controls all the copies can publish a false list; see the planned public log (0.2)

What it does not cover, by design

  • The truth of the project or the quality of the review. A seal or a signature proves provenance and integrity only.
  • The identity of the signer. An on-screen signature is a simple electronic signature; the seal and the issuer's signature prove when the follow-up existed, not who wrote it.
  • A date proven independently of the issuer. The issuer's clock is sealed and signed; a time stamp by a time-stamping authority (RFC 3161, proof.timestamps) proves the date without relying on the issuer.

Privacy

  • For verification, registration and the decision seal, the issuer receives fingerprints only, never texts, names, decisions, signatures or documents. An issuer that also produces the report receives the texts to write it and keeps none of them; the provider of the AI model it uses may keep them for a limited period, stated on the issuer's privacy page. A SHA-256 fingerprint cannot be turned back into the text; it only lets someone confirm a text they already have, or guess.
  • The fingerprint of a final document is computed on the signer's device; the document is never sent.
  • The issuer stores no texts and no list of IDs or fingerprints. Only short-lived rate-limit counters, keyed on a hash of the IP address made with a secret key of their own, are kept.
  • Whoever holds a record file holds the texts, the names in the follow-up, and the name of the final document. Share it as you would share the report.
  • A register entry without the texts is planned, for registers that must not hold the project.

06Registered issuer prefixes

An implementation that writes AttestScope records needs its own prefix before its first record used for a decision. Request one by email to hello@riftveil.ai, with the prefix, name, contact, URL of the verification endpoint and URL of the key list. Each request is reviewed and may be declined, for example if the prefix could be confused with another issuer's.

Prefix Issuer Verification Keys Since
RV Riftveil (riftveil.ai) POST https://riftveil.ai/api/verify https://riftveil.ai/keys.json 2026-09-27
XT Reserved for tests, never valid for a decision none https://attestscope.ai/test-keys.json (public test key) 2026-09-27

07Versions

Version Date Changes
0.1.1 2026-10-26 Issuer signature: Ed25519 over the same message as each seal, in proof.signature and follow_up.proof.signature, required in 0.1.1 files; public key list (keys.json) and its rules; verification without the issuer. Optional proof.timestamps (RFC 3161 time stamps, a list). Follow-up profile riftveil-decision-v2: optional final_document (fingerprint of the document that was decided, computed on the signer's device) and previous (completing a sealed follow-up later, earlier follow-ups kept with their proof). Follow-up of a registered report. format becomes "attestscope", version "0.1.1"; schema attestscope-0.1.1.schema.json, with a conditional rule on the fields each fingerprint profile needs. decided_at stated as informative. Single illustrative example (Elena Lambert). Security rules from a review before publication: later signature (countersignature) only for records dated before the issuer started signing, and shown as such; issued_at equal to the time of the ID; unsigned files dated after signing started rejected; canonical signature encoding; signing key kept out of test and preview deployments; the name in a follow-up is declared, never verified. No existing profile changes: 0.1 files stay valid.
0.1 2026-09-27 First public version: proof file, record ID, profiles riftveil-report-v1, riftveil-content-v1, riftveil-decision-v1, HMAC seals, follow-up with decision, verification rules, JSON Schema, test vectors. "Record file" replaces "proof file" in the text; field names are unchanged. Assay Record was the working name of the test version. In record files, the format field reads assay-record and the version field 0.1-draft.

Reports issued on riftveil.ai before 24 October 2026 carry the working numbering 1.3.x of the Riftveil protocol in assessment.protocol (for example 1.3.3); their seal stays verifiable.

Planned for 0.2

  • Canonical JSON (RFC 8785) as a fingerprint input, alongside the current profiles.
  • Register entry: the record without content, and a public log.
  • Per-finding follow-up, outcome, and readers[] with their own fingerprints.
  • Identity of the person who decides: the organisation's account, or a qualified electronic signature over the follow-up.

Compatibility rule

A new version never changes how an existing profile is computed. A verifier for 0.1.1 verifies every 0.1 record file; a verifier for 0.2 will verify every 0.1 and 0.1.1 record file.

Governance

Riftveil publishes the format and is its reference implementation. Comments go to hello@riftveil.ai. Changes are published in this table before they apply.

08Example

Illustrative record: Elena Lambert’s follow-up, completed two days later with the final document. The prefix XT is reserved for tests: its seals and signatures are made with the public test keys and are never valid for a decision. View on GitHub · JSON Schema on GitHub · Test key list

{
  "format": "attestscope",
  "version": "0.1.1",
  "record_id": "XT-261026-143205-7K3M-Q9XD-2B8F",
  "issuer": "XT",
  "origin": "generated",
  "issued_at": "2026-10-26T14:32:05Z",
  "assessment": {
    "protocol": "1.0.0",
    "model": "claude-sonnet-5",
    "assistant": "riftveil.ai",
    "language": "en"
  },
  "content": {
    "project": "We recommend consolidating our three cloud vendors into one five-year contract from Q1 2027. The chosen vendor offers a 22% discount in year one, full migration support and a single point of contact. Savings are estimated at EUR 1.4M over five years.",
    "context": "Chief Financial Officer, board decision next month.",
    "report": "## Record\n- Triage: CRITICAL · examined: question, answer, reasoning, perspective, applicability\n- Findings: 3, by impact CRITICAL: 1 · HIGH: 2 · MODERATE: 0 · LOW: 0\n- Assumptions: 4 with a named verifier · 0 without\n- Questions: 5 with an owner · 1 without\n- Most useful question: \"What does leaving the contract cost if the price rises after the first year?\"\n- Independence: not stated by the user, to be confirmed by the signer\n\n## 1. Context and triage\nThis project is read as a procurement and finance recommendation for a Chief Financial Officer, intended to inform a five-year vendor commitment at board level. Triage: CRITICAL, because a single five-year contract is hard to undo and the financial commitment is high for the organisation. Examined: question, answer, reasoning, perspective, applicability.\nCriteria: reversibility HIGH · impact scope MODERATE · financial commitment HIGH → two criteria at HIGH or above → CRITICAL.\n\nThe five levels of examination: question (what was actually asked) · answer (what the project says) · reasoning (how it gets there) · perspective (what it did not see) · applicability (what it looks like in the real world). Triage: the project's stakes, LOW, MODERATE, HIGH or CRITICAL, judged on reversibility, impact scope and financial commitment; it sets which levels are examined.\n\nIf this framing does not match your situation, say so, and the triage will be redone.\n\n## 2. What holds up\nThe recommendation names one vendor, one start date and one contract length: each can be checked against the offers. A review of what stands, not an endorsement of its content.\n\n## 3. What deserves scrutiny\n\nNote on reasoning: an AI model does not reason in the human sense; the reasoning checks below test logical consistency, not the process that produced the project.\n\n**Pre-mortem: three plausible causes of failure · Impact: CRITICAL**\nObserved: the memo gives no scenario in which the consolidation fails.\nEffect on the decision: three plausible causes are left unexamined: prices rise after year one, a workload cannot move in time, the single vendor's service degrades with no way out.\nTo check: for each cause, what the contract says and who in the organisation would see it coming.\n\n**Exit cost not quantified · Impact: HIGH**\nObserved: the memo proposes a single five-year contract without quantifying what leaving it would cost.\nEffect on the decision: if the price rises after the first year, that cost weighs on the board's decision.\nTo check: ask procurement for the exit cost of each offer, year by year.\n\n**Prices for years 2 to 5 not given · Impact: HIGH**\nObserved: \"a 22% discount in year one\" supports \"savings are estimated at EUR 1.4M over five years\".\nEffect on the decision: a discount limited to year one says nothing about years two to five, where most of the contract value lies.\nTo check: the price schedule for every year of the contract, in the draft contract itself.\n\n## 4. Assumptions the project relies on\n1. Prices after year one stay close to year one. If they rise, the EUR 1.4M saving does not hold. → Who can verify: procurement, with the full price schedule.\n2. All workloads can move before the current contracts end. If not, two vendors are paid at the same time. → Who can verify: the CIO.\n3. The vendor's migration support covers the work the teams would otherwise do. If not, the internal cost is missing from the saving. → Who can verify: the CIO, with the heads of the teams concerned.\n4. One point of contact is enough for three former vendors' services. If not, service levels drop during the first year. → Who can verify: the head of IT operations.\n\n## 5. Questions before you decide\n1. What does leaving the contract cost if the price rises after the first year? Owner: procurement\n2. What are the prices for years 2 to 5 of each offer? Owner: procurement\n3. Which workloads cannot move before the current contracts end? Owner: CIO\n4. What internal effort does the migration need, beyond the vendor's support? Owner: CIO\n5. Which service levels does the contract guarantee, and what happens if they are missed? Owner: head of IT operations\n6. Who will answer to the board if the saving is not there in year three?\n\nNo verdict. The decision is yours."
  },
  "proof": {
    "fingerprint": {
      "alg": "sha-256",
      "profile": "riftveil-report-v1",
      "value": "44ad2fc8676594a6105c621a93dd051de1648c47253351689c8b7f24f84689d9"
    },
    "seal": {
      "value": "S1-REQ8-RW0G-J013-M23D-C969-73JZ-MF93-1W6J",
      "verify": "https://riftveil.ai/api/verify"
    },
    "signature": {
      "alg": "ed25519",
      "key": "ed25519-1",
      "value": "RLk8n-uArHiModfTXjm3Inw8iWm4zVQAMPYczqz-pRtfVx_Z3vbBmV2hQrsdpme4TCZtanhr_mUfWOttBsPsDQ",
      "keys": "https://attestscope.ai/test-keys.json"
    }
  },
  "follow_up": {
    "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2",
    "verified_by": {
      "last_name": "Lambert",
      "first_name": "Elena",
      "role": "Chief Financial Officer"
    },
    "checked": "The prices for years 2 to 5 of the three offers, with procurement. Exit-cost analysis received from Daniel Murphy on 28 October and presented to the board: exit capped at six months of fees.",
    "questions": [
      {
        "n": 1,
        "question": "What does leaving the contract cost if the price rises after the first year?",
        "suggested_owner": "procurement",
        "assigned_to": "Daniel Murphy, Head of Procurement"
      },
      {
        "n": 2,
        "question": "What are the prices for years 2 to 5 of each offer?",
        "suggested_owner": "procurement",
        "assigned_to": ""
      },
      {
        "n": 3,
        "question": "Which workloads cannot move before the current contracts end?",
        "suggested_owner": "CIO",
        "assigned_to": ""
      },
      {
        "n": 4,
        "question": "What internal effort does the migration need, beyond the vendor's support?",
        "suggested_owner": "CIO",
        "assigned_to": ""
      },
      {
        "n": 5,
        "question": "Which service levels does the contract guarantee, and what happens if they are missed?",
        "suggested_owner": "head of IT operations",
        "assigned_to": ""
      },
      {
        "n": 6,
        "question": "Who will answer to the board if the saving is not there in year three?",
        "suggested_owner": "",
        "assigned_to": ""
      }
    ],
    "decision": "conditions",
    "conditions": "Contract signed only after the exit-cost analysis, presented to the board.",
    "place": "",
    "signature": {
      "method": "drawn",
      "typed": "",
      "image": 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"
    },
    "final_document": {
      "name": "Board memo - cloud contract.pdf",
      "size": 103,
      "sha256": "2df7e602ebf9f09606a0a9f30bd6ea852065c216793b99f2797707aeb512e54d"
    },
    "previous": {
      "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2",
      "verified_by": {
        "last_name": "Lambert",
        "first_name": "Elena",
        "role": "Chief Financial Officer"
      },
      "checked": "The prices for years 2 to 5 of the three offers, with procurement.",
      "questions": [
        {
          "n": 1,
          "question": "What does leaving the contract cost if the price rises after the first year?",
          "suggested_owner": "procurement",
          "assigned_to": "Daniel Murphy, Head of Procurement"
        },
        {
          "n": 2,
          "question": "What are the prices for years 2 to 5 of each offer?",
          "suggested_owner": "procurement",
          "assigned_to": ""
        },
        {
          "n": 3,
          "question": "Which workloads cannot move before the current contracts end?",
          "suggested_owner": "CIO",
          "assigned_to": ""
        },
        {
          "n": 4,
          "question": "What internal effort does the migration need, beyond the vendor's support?",
          "suggested_owner": "CIO",
          "assigned_to": ""
        },
        {
          "n": 5,
          "question": "Which service levels does the contract guarantee, and what happens if they are missed?",
          "suggested_owner": "head of IT operations",
          "assigned_to": ""
        },
        {
          "n": 6,
          "question": "Who will answer to the board if the saving is not there in year three?",
          "suggested_owner": "",
          "assigned_to": ""
        }
      ],
      "decision": "conditions",
      "conditions": "Contract signed only after the exit-cost analysis, presented to the board.",
      "place": "",
      "signature": {
        "method": "drawn",
        "typed": "",
        "image": 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U/pXLOZ/YvBvzWktesb8CzrjTZPghUqaQvF0s0i0m2q4xSXo/mPhP1sG5JnOGl0blgB/HDyWin00tk6B+O5ZCthBYBU6J5Fycg9p46ujr1zEvh3M+wLt1G+un1WfKxQZpFvbX8d6X46EwLA7Bvhbvh37jTv8gYAhWR4n5mNTA5uhb367Ez23jTf2nEHJXd9VvnfcOzq6lmtLinQ5YYH+/Ya7B7SOVM9qsYbC21rVmbnmGcgsgkAK7R1vpdi/wrgEphPwyZsmVD1myvlvhsQPL85LO6cSsVZKe/+kK/5y6D+LoCOlMWACem25oudDxSKpU2ZwGTCFWoCw3Xsnor8Fr1g3YoQVaV3isi1pumYOLcGZGKqt1TKuy+vDPbfG77Xrgk8yxo5zoNgBf+iZWXHFSDvyFaOmlT9faNDS/74+JKBk6UGQ6PHGMbEi2bhu9uSJR0XEnxjCDhIqH1lBtFVvY9lx/pY0vlkq7zi7H2sPdnn8/r6U0Fatqq35nQHmgFdyeDg4JgR3wyTEzRi3RmOAwfsrC1aubpEyi+ZpjWQjQAgitvC35yNmrQs9R7HJ838BIhmce7VNHfZ5Ng4vWPuluzm+VnS3QnYagDng5Io7AHU0lfVpYDz0eRw0qtNjh55fN9oue9mpvoKNXuQTBKz1AtxJcjt+bb0m6F2a33DdE0gwk6F5e2L860dmzX1W0H3xwQvnIqqVB8G9K2Vct/WOlP9Wdlxdr5SQlPB7QQdiMRge0IquDM9df3QcZc2RDGhxcuLW1tbW87wLjuZAlmtEb/CLHQxs6MJ9A+OSaFmMploPWY2PuVjwd58lumqADt9vnX9eaRcZja5RUUfqpQH7j/Lcg4V4PvBd9cqDa9YhVWNp2m8C7J6HnUN/wigIfwux8z0+tGD/TuCKT4rW35C6j08mXoLTb1X8HdWYVXzDP03mY6Ueny+rfR/QdlsPh0DUANwCIZfqA7uvqpy5PH/wik34c8V08b86OGBXdXy7k1m/hZAxi3MIE/wx0G5P1+s/WdLsfPLhWLpA/nWdZsLxY4/ySeyU8RtA3ilaZpSpD6quiJEVWGnxLPBqzpHgpU1mFuxdqNQukIlrTh6/46QCnadltIL5JG67OaFqnqmGzIF6E0Xt65tJ3hD8K7Emem3nhp6fM9kgd2MJ1O5/wmDfpOks1Cp/3NnV97QHe7srH2K5OqwVcLGnJeb6vy+MzcUjf+eTfLDJFccKTa95jQWMCb9yLriUJsASTP/pkq578/qJsZsoqK4zWAeZip06w+3Nn8kTPT1uROIVubpHLOsvylf7HxA4N4XymmkmZQcTW+qlCf3y53T/X1WZ7JLpdy3FbX0VWb2PVAcpoRL1oHsJmULadtAeQfBdgtp7QtBSUz162p4Y4iqJk37Z38zxLkULGZpjTPnbgdIikvU/NdGDw7sOD1/I0stjEPTK4XSOM5lLz+Nifb06Ape3I2kNGelDMhKGfT0IqNQ3kDwLyc3tBN80aIV7kKcUS1Nvci7t5j6CbokB9hvjhzavft0Rf5EESEV3zHTKohVJBMjb5h5RLg+N+1HumtM/Rida4LZB6tDA1+dTldmk7B7YPRg/w5TvZPicqbpBEVuDnVLk/Vdx3s6QG+6qHXtpfli5wMgt5O40iytUVyjmn7NULtydGjgvrrxuBBSpantOpUjj/9XtZxsgOnVBvsuKG5quw8sxLUgwpYaScz0ETV7U2Uo2RgeODIl2B7PAeawMCzbrb+y9H4mbqul6ZMQaYK3N1cO9T14mmkNAVhra2tLhcv2EVhKCqDWPTq0+74zMHcFAPLFjq8Q/GmQicH2LpGRH89qvk5nGT40+yt2rEnB75thWIRLVfHu6tDubad5bMyqxTVfLD0o4GtAipr1VMu733qaPZhOeV3yxdKdQvllM6NBH2stT7zsB/jB+Kn/dlYTtrLjcnPyNailoTjUf75S7r9xdo7vVOemW1bh6w2Hi/lvEWwH1LJo4obqUO6LxxSmtv1EocXGXkeTdiVuBOwihFIOZwBMdWt1qP+WaW9rwU7oulW89Q0t59VerYb/JSYvVLPlBBaR/IHBHqXYztEnc4/WnQf3XBGqSZK5O8m9acvKjitM+NFQcyUr1fSu6qH+r52pBzMxkU/QaOnTVgrvO0OzfXUKvh6AEKSpfuXA4IHqGYifAUATnxocscUjBBcBcKC+HsDnTlNMHNBbKxRLHyDlCjPvYaw2pXpLNUQLMlti4FT+2RzeC6gSsvpHSxpegGHsxYmXubOq5960UCxtMuKPYEZkxaHVcv87w+/0Yg59HwOA/dg/1qLt74HLPWShLYKnyLZC0f+aWec/APguqZebHb0cTDqMBqiOQQiATmEPEPbR6lD/gzi2G8NCRTFV3LprYvRJ7ACw45kXF547UdVcp4QEgPPPPz9vwj8H0AyABgxqqluzEP9MigiT4eEfDAPcka1wneFKYb3ZLsmZme3HH9vg4OAYgAcp0mRmAuDK06winxJ5gB8NfkTiDHZP2C+4ITc76UpYpJBa9RE1fQIhnWisNeJXwnfZ4E4w+CeLK7eRsh3A2swMG3Fa+7nMuBbMuUkdikVHDw7sMPOfBehBumyD9ToR3kLis5mn02Hm1WCgc800+xpMr6oO7r6qMtj34LMsVZosVq3z5ab8Nhxb4jAlwM/JPvhzIFjBY3kqbXln2CtoRzND+0tHjzy+bwY1V6e+cDY5+Q0AWsNELp5G+tabLmkrrc7Mdn+GZvuJTWGTHky1+5VC1edfOMPU++ki3wSQZn6fpfgIslXD2Rv8XW54+L+PiOETpBNTXyPkXUEsd9bCgsHUJPA4//x8oVj6KMVtNtNxGDzAUfN2XdjUPJ9GdY8CYKXc9w4AGzJfR0ge7+mANRh2mPo7Rst9V1bKfQ88yw3oKV/uWL+tvsThuf3Ajjkz3ZX2U5kDnTPTWo74/dmYeCT+BZhqQveKJUuGWmbehC6Y7TW195KSh6F25mb7cVELeJQPquqYmR0kkfNsuLT+c59B5G0kXXTDsSJvPWOH+3+YRT2zaAb3egCyKBm5R833gZIDkFPh3cuWrVkCDIxPToJCsf3qvF/8TVJ+3bw/CrIxHBu7qwf7/6EuUpnPSZuJ1u7vVgeTV5B+o8JvMegDUHsUZl9W+C3i8ZJKeXdXpdx363R08txMlZ4vJLMvgL1++fL2VUfhLjPT0IzP9LawTePs28HQ4/GpoyYmQrY5U7JIjHgVYAayyUz3L05Gto3OvLL9pORyac1TxmksAJDT9LFMYW+XECUkZjY2WyJ/4knfLQcO9FRbVra8yxwfDAY6SxMNyTcKxY6/DOdJSmZ6BUzNIJalu/1G/+HqUP9Xz3HbXKvzdXqRGWgniV4nI8AoVDHCqie0GD6a8PeEXEoKzfSharn/I7NWmyNsqB+MIm6GgjVZLtC5USiXmBkBq1LtbVnbFZxFOG1AV3L48MAIYA9QpHnSx2ptbc2f2sfqdtn2ls0U+UlTnWBYnv7Ds9+L90x+UF2pgEsaYVqDsYN0HyLdhwi+ieAyEbcSwJiq31pxT710emvHOU+r9Fhf5zhPR+r8n0gUrJMJgrs29IS22uxu0wBMkasTF9ZqSW6GE9Ta2toKJvpOUxsjHQy2bfRg/8OzmNbYlI9llhKy5CiW/0R2fuTE57/HL1rR2Uny7qw/fIOaPlwd6v9gXSO3OaLXA92uOvSCW03TW0DJTXpBllV2UJyo6b2i8tLqUP8t2f66hbS1o87XOc7T0TjFo2CdevSEFsNGOmfQu8M2jS45++gqCB6p+81sAmZeKIvRbFfU+UCnEFNoVZe+RETeDlqTmaYutc/PnphO+1ih3QwOhuWayU3a5RNUYm9wAJx39hmSCQA16JM52A1hsvXO9fYQC9elN62U+7Z6r1cobKtBH4DhG6q6BZr+fLXc99bwtJepvuMxYok8mz2s6eiK5MbwxBCbyI3jk3jGfuMzTmEUABrt8LfGsHyc5KJs2s9gQpcJQDxwmYSSImdmg01u+HsjgAI9s9YMrqVleGzYtxwg5EILNQPvAdbfCRSfNsnX54CdE1M1V+onKEmD+Yn3DR98fM858Idc1h734ZPf3J79WzsiMcKqi67st0NHAYHBHhke7n9isqfTbAmCiBjq28wYLp+x30G9PERpYkbsHBoaqtY1cZuFaCW0IRbj75FkKMrki1pWpGuyCDOLAjfkgF0TLa3t14C8I+u8GhrzzU5bljPBn8ILmo+uBZHIvAhWiK6KHVcRuDQ81sk0e4DDbA7yM20zM1mQeTkhl4fe4KCY/dPsT8KpcoFtarofEAKWWMK/W1LsWAPA0N7eGB5y0HGd0f0RzAyUBjXdHRrznUk74dkUrRN6QRanSuS5Ilh6AS5oMuDTABxJp6Zfzx7g4ObkqcIzbzNDAFi1alWzCb9AYikAqvm9i5PRP8nSVT+rR4ZuHjhwoErFrzI8E94TXFsD/xEbNjgMDIznW9tflz1gdFkmBkedn3hjKNrssSgQkcicCFZoUHd4WfPLhFLKnhYJgn9R5x3NwUHPtM1MqLo/crTwblJWmdpRUgjDZJM+N/viELaPVA72fUnN91KSBlM/RkqpsO+pv80XS3eR8hUzTQHzlCQH2G+MHHpi9zkowoxEnk+CFTpu+px/O0CCEDM76kz/JkspZnnyTbaZ8TNsMzNKADDqhZiuuq/kiE9j1hYDTihaBnS7HPAOM91Lcc1QHQflp4TyywCawqqgmGl6T6V8/l1zX8IQiTy/BUuA3nTp0osuOH5f3sDes9yXdzIhyFYKj/xH3QMpGkDXeoKIjsDPemBDDsRPmykYngP3uawgcy5riRToseFy/56Etslgj9K5xhATGiiOangQ5Msr5b4bglD1Puf3gUUi51CwQtfJiVz6a9m+vHR29uU9I8evFIYHKTzt87oFuF0LxZG7hW4dADWzsdy4fGJuo6t60ep2w4N9e92Y+xlT+xWDbYfhG6b+jmp596bK4GPfw3Q1dhSrSGSuRAMI3QXyxdLhQrFkhWKn5YulJ84///w8pvsMzQHhwZL5Ysd9LW3rrKVtnTUXO/62/rVJb62ltf2alrZ1VmjtmGhpW2f51o4tx77vnN8UJA6lSGTOI6xuAcCRWuGVBFtgViNpAvvYzJ84c5aKqbIDCE9SEOOKQrH0EyFq2pADerR5efsqo9tqpilFnJrumJ/tLieKtKaf+vs0wYwGeyQy94IVzHYV/nZ4qKnLmepnRsv9n5n7oscgNo3qt6npIQCkuEvMbDMARVeLATAmspXkqlD7QKH3twHwmXE/3+mXHV/fFIlE5oGQbuWLHb9ZaOu0QrFk+WLpyNKlF10wf2lOqL7OF0t/0dK2zgrFUlpo6/zvpvMuugCAFIqdH2tpu8gKrR1jhbZO31zs+Mf6Y49EIs9OTtdnEgC6bNmaH5vIJQMAhBTxlv7DWHngZ+dvS8nk3sXSJia839TGKdJk6vcaWBWRi818DXQ5mHnU0pdUjjy+C3GLSSTyfEoJs5XBBvdbpOTCyiAoxn+e38POijMP9T2gpjvokqYgUFxN4cWmfgKUHMz6Ab0+iFX3HPWVikQiCzHCIgBbhVXNh4vN/0FwHUAz6BNL3OiLDxw4MJa9b778IQFgi1vb1yjdRw32lmzTNQiBmt/VWEsvPXJkzzBO/CSYSCTy3I2wwsrgkRX5Swk5L6wMCgneNXfbXE6JArCnhgYeHy3vvhawt8HswVDnlN4uDl1BrOJ2l0jkeUh9/dNFViiW0nyx80dL2kqrMd03+xxFiSetq2K8bpHI8zQSW9JWWp0vdv6oUCylLW3rLF/suK9ezM4xrk40XRSrSOR5mxKGx1SlhjcJZQnMNPS8Yvbw0eJC2Fbi61K/uC8vEnn+ClbRAIjBfh5QgJJTs72VQ307QiTTE7sMRCKRhSBYoeZpUWvnqwl5ZXjiDBVmfwOgduqHP0QikcjsMQPvKXRd8LTrnMs1mHoYDAns98PrvXEFLhKJLBTByh6vBfy1eX+eQQlgJPS8ipXjkUgkEolEIsdxOkv/MrlaGLtjRiKRSCQSiUQikUgkEolEIpFIJBKJRCKRSCQSiUQikUgkEolEIpFIJBKJRCKRSCQSiUQikUgkEolEIpFIJBKJRCKRSCQSiUQikUgkEolEIpFIJBKJRCKRSOSM+P9LKPoj45K25gAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
      },
      "decided_at": "2026-10-26T16:05:12Z",
      "proof": {
        "fingerprint": {
          "alg": "sha-256",
          "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2",
          "value": "2fd3a2ae0b4685c971c0cb7e780bf97736d02ff3f25f3e42ad953cfa180115c2"
        },
        "seal": {
          "value": "S1-SP2R-M6Z9-3Y27-M5MB-YB16-57G7-MX47-8GFY",
          "sealed_at": "2026-10-26T16:05:12Z",
          "verify": "https://riftveil.ai/api/verify"
        },
        "signature": {
          "alg": "ed25519",
          "key": "ed25519-1",
          "value": "H0tFeR7Q-VELQlHZEsR9AkvBDaKZmP2Obc7CuPehNrHaA5XHmRtrPcSsOHsPStb1MU6BcQKTS8MVWHaKDlUmAw",
          "keys": "https://attestscope.ai/test-keys.json"
        }
      }
    },
    "decided_at": "2026-10-28T09:41:27Z",
    "proof": {
      "fingerprint": {
        "alg": "sha-256",
        "profile": "riftveil-decision-v2",
        "value": "137a5d48553a886223ef5392e910d1e16e7d46aebb82e5fa8bef058963ff7522"
      },
      "seal": {
        "value": "S1-30WH-D58W-8MVE-6G4Y-8KSE-30J0-G3YC-RX4S",
        "sealed_at": "2026-10-28T09:41:27Z",
        "verify": "https://riftveil.ai/api/verify"
      },
      "signature": {
        "alg": "ed25519",
        "key": "ed25519-1",
        "value": "Nk-dIGehodcncNA9pOvyC3KMAjeoXkHQIEggGaVoZAobxLkHL8FmUMYx61uwYrl560NvoV0pVAAgerL-cWvsCQ",
        "keys": "https://attestscope.ai/test-keys.json"
      }
    }
  },
  "notice": "Illustrative record. People, organisations and amounts are fictitious. The prefix XT is reserved for tests: the seals use the public test key assay-test-key-1 and the signatures the public Ed25519 test key of docs/test-vectors.json; they are never valid at riftveil.ai. The final document is a short text given in docs/test-vectors.json."
}